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The central problem in understanding economic development and
growth is not, in fact, to understand the process by which an economy
raises its savings rate and increases the rate of physical capital accu-
mulation.1 Many development practitioners and researchers continue
to target capital accumulation as the driving force in economic growth.2
This paper, however, presents evidence regarding the sources and pat-
terns of economic growth, the patterns of factor flows, and the impact
This paper was originally published in the World Bank Economic Review 15(2):
177-219, 2001. Reprinted with permission. We owe a great deal to Lant Pritchett,
who shaped the paper, gave comments, and provided many of the stylized facts. We
are grateful to François Bourguignon, Ashok Dhareshwar, Robert G. King, Michael
Kremer, Peter Klenow, Paul Romer, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Robert Solow, and Albert
Zeufack for useful comments. This paper’s findings, interpretations, and conclu-
sions are entirely those of the authors; they do not necessarily represent the views
of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
1. This is a reversal and slight rewording of Arthur Lewis’s (1954, p. 155)
famous quote, “The central problem in the theory of economic development is to
understand the process by which a community which was previously saving and
investing 4 or 5 percent of its national income or less, converts itself into an economy
where voluntary saving is running at about 12 to 15 percent of national income or
more. This is the central problem because the central fact of development is rapid
capital accumulation (including knowledge and skills with capital).” While Lewis
recognizes the importance of knowledge and skills and later in his book highlights
the importance of institutions, many development economists who followed Lewis
adopted the more limited focus on saving and physical capital accumulation.
2. Academic researchers in the 1990s started a neoclassical revival (in the
words of Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare, 1997b). The classic works in the academic
Economic Growth: Sources, Trends, and Cycles, edited by Norman Loayza
and Raimundo Soto, Santiago, Chile. © 2002 Central Bank of Chile.
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of national policies on economic growth that suggest that something
other than capital accumulation is critical for understanding differ-
ences in economic growth and income across countries. The paper does
not argue that factor accumulation is unimportant in general; nor do
we deny that factor accumulation is critically important for some coun-
tries at specific junctures. The paper’s more limited point is that when
comparing growth experiences across many countries, something be-
sides factor accumulation plays a prominent role in explaining differ-
ences in economic performance. As Robert Solow argued in 1956, econo-
mists construct models to reproduce crucial empirical regularities and
then use these models to interpret economic events and make policy
recommendations. This paper documents important empirical regu-
larities regarding economic growth in the hopes of highlighting pro-
ductive directions for future research and improving public policy.
A growing body of research indicates that after accounting for
physical and human capital accumulation, something else accounts
for the bulk of cross-country growth differences. This “something else”
accounts for the majority of cross-country differences in both the level
of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and the growth rate of per
capita GDP. The profession typically uses the term total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) to refer to the “something else” (other than physical
factor accumulation) that accounts for economic growth differences.
We follow the convention of using the term TFP to refer to this unex-
plained part of growth.
Different theories provide very different conceptions of TFP. Some
model TFP as changes in technology (the “instructions” for producing
literature’s focus on factor accumulation are Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992),
Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Mankiw (1995), and Young (1995).
The summary of the Global Development Network conference in Prague in
June 2000, representing many international organizations and development
research institutes, says “physical capital accumulation was found to be the
dominant source of growth both within and across regions. Total factor produc-
tivity growth (TFPG) was not as important as was previously believed”
(www.gdnet.org/pdfs/GRPPragueMtgReport.pdf). A leading development text-
book (Todaro, 2000) says that an increase in investment is “a necessary condi-
tion” for economic takeoff. Another development textbook (Ray, 1998) refers to
investment and saving as “the foundations of all models of economic growth.”
Many development practitioners also stress investment. For example, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund argues, “The adjustment experience of sub-Saharan
Africa has demonstrated that to achieve gains in real per capita GDP an expan-
sion in private saving and investment is key” (see Easterly, 1999). The Bank for
International Settlements concludes, “recent experience has underlined the cen-
tral importance of national saving and investment rates in promoting growth”
(Easterly, 1999). The International Labor Organization argues that “policies to
raise the rate of investment... are critical for raising the rate of growth and63 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
goods and services); others highlight the role of externalities. Some
focus on changes in the sector composition of production; still others
see TFP as reflecting the adoption of lower cost production methods.
These theories thus provide very different views of TFP. Empirically
distinguishing among these different theories would provide clearer
guidance to policymakers and growth theorists. We do not have empiri-
cal evidence, however, that confidently assesses the relative importance
of each of these conceptions of TFP in explaining economic growth.
Economists need to provide much more shape and substance to the
amorphous term, TFP.
This paper examines five stylized facts. While we examine each
individually, we emphasize a simple theme: researchers need a better
understanding of TFP and its determinants to more precisely model
long-run economic growth and design appropriate policies.
Stylized fact 1: Factor accumulation does not account for the bulk
of cross-country differences in the level or growth rate of per capita
GDP; something else—TFP—accounts for a substantial amount of cross-
country differences. The search for the secrets of long-run economic
growth must therefore place a high priority on rigorously defining the
term TFP, empirically dissecting TFP, and identifying the policies and
institutions most conducive to TFP growth.
Stylized fact 2: The huge, growing differences in per capita GDP
worldwide indicate that divergence—not conditional convergence—is
the big story. An emphasis on TFP growth with increasing returns to
technology is more consistent with divergence than models of factor
accumulation with decreasing returns, no scale economies, and some
employment in an economy” (Easterly, 1999). The United Nations boldly claims
that “additional investment is the answer—or part of the answer—to most policy
problems in the economic and social arena” (Easterly, 1999). Similarly, the World
Bank states that in East Asia, “accumulation of productive assets is the founda-
tion of economic growth” and promises that in Latin America, “enhancing saving
and investment by 8 percentage points of GDP would raise the annual growth
figure by around 2 percentage points” (Easterly, 1999). World Bank (2000a)a
says the saving rate of the typical African country “is far below what is needed to
sustain a long-term boost in economic performance.” The World Bank (2000c)
says that South Eastern Europe can only seize trade opportunities if “domestic
and foreign entrepreneurs increase their investment dramatically.” For more
citations, see Easterly (1999) and King and Levine (1994).Although common,
the stress on capital accumulation is far from universal among development
practitioners and researchers. For example, the World Bank (2000b) report on
East Asia’s recovery suggests “future growth hinges less on increasing physical
capital accumulation and more on raising the productivity growth of all factors.”
Collier, Dollar, and Stern (2000) stress policies, incentives, institutions, and ex-
ogenous factors as the main drivers in growth with little mention of investment,
as does the World Development Report (World Bank, 2000–2001, pp. 49–52).64 William Easterly and Ross Levine
fixed factor of production. The big story of the past two centuries is that
the difference between the richest countries and poorest countries is
growing. Moreover, the growth rates of the rich are not slowing, and
returns to capital are not falling. Just as business-cycles look like little
wiggles around the big story when viewed over a long horizon, under-
standing slow, intermittent conditional convergence seems far less per-
tinent than uncovering why the United States has enjoyed very steady
growth for two hundred years while much of the earth’s population
still lives in poverty.
Stylized fact 3: Growth is not persistent over time—some countries
take off, others are subject to peaks and valleys, a few grow steadily, and
others have never grown—but capital accumulation is persistent, much
more so than overall growth. Changes in factor accumulation do not
match up closely with changes in economic growth. This finding is con-
sistent across very different frequencies of data. This stylized fact fur-
ther suggests that models of steady-state growth, whether based on capi-
tal externalities or technological spillovers, will not capture the experi-
ences of many countries. While the United States has grown very consis-
tently over time, other countries have had very different experiences.
Steady-state growth models may thus fit the United States’ experience
over the last two hundred years, but they will not fit the experiences of
Argentina, Venezuela, Korea, or Thailand. In contrast, models of mul-
tiple equilibria do not fit the U.S. data very well. Our models thus tend
to be country-specific rather than general theories. Meanwhile, the
profession’s empirical work still centers on discovering why the United
States is the United States, how a country like Argentina can go from
being like the United States early in this century to struggling as a
middle-income country today, and how a country like Korea or Thailand
can go from being like Somalia to enjoying a thriving economy.
Stylized fact 4: All factors of production flow to the same places,
suggesting important externalities. This fact is noted and modeled by
Lucas (1988), Kremer (1993), and others. Our paper further demonstrates
the powerful and pervasive tendency for all factors of production, includ-
ing physical and human capital, to bunch together. The consequence is
that economic activity is highly concentrated. The tendency holds whether
considering the globe, countries, regions, states, ethnic groups, or cities.
This force—this “something else”—needs to be fleshed out and then firmly
imbedded in economic theories and policy recommendations.
Stylized fact 5: National policies influence long-run growth. In
models with zero productivity growth, diminishing returns to the fac-
tors of production, and some fixed factor, national policies that boost65 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
physical or human capital accumulation have only a transitional effect
on growth. In models emphasizing total factor productivity growth,
however, national policies that enhance the efficiency of capital and
labor or alter the endogenous rate of technological change can boost
productivity growth and thereby accelerate long-run economic growth.
The finding that policy influences growth is thus consistent with theo-
ries that emphasize productivity growth and technological externali-
ties, and it makes one increasingly wary of theories that focus exces-
sively on factor accumulation.
Although many authors examine total factor productivity growth
and assess growth models, this paper makes a number of new contri-
butions. Besides conducting traditional growth accounting based on
capital stock data from the new Penn World Table (Summers and
Heston, 1991), this paper fully exploits the panel nature of the data.
Specifically, we use the international cross-section of countries to ad-
dress two questions: what accounts for cross-country growth differences,
and what accounts for growth differences over time? Overwhelmingly
the answer is total factor productivity, not factor accumulation. The
paper also examines differences in the level of gross domestic product
per worker across countries. We update Denison’s (1962) original level
accounting study, and we extend Mankiw, Romer, and Weil’s (1992)
study by allowing technology to differ across countries and by assess-
ing the importance of country-specific effects. Unlike Mankiw, Romer,
Weil, we find that huge differences in total factor productivity account
for the bulk of cross-country differences in per capita income, even af-
ter controlling for country-specific effects. In terms of divergence, the
paper compiles and presents new information that further documents
massive divergence in the level of per capita income across countries.
We show that although many authors frequently base their modeling
strategies on the U.S. experience of steady long-run growth (for ex-
ample, Jones, 1995a, 1995b; Rebelo and Stokey 1995), the U.S. experi-
ence is the exception rather than the rule. Much of the world is charac-
terized by miracles and disasters, by changing long-run growth rates,
and not by stable long-run growth rates. Finally, the paper presents an
abundance of new evidence on the concentration of economic activity.
We draw on cross-country information, data from counties within the
United States, developing country studies, and information on the in-
ternational flow of capital, labor, and human capital to demonstrate
the geographic concentration of activity and relate it to models of eco-
nomic growth. The overwhelming concentration of economic activity is
consistent with some theories of economic growth and inconsistent with66 William Easterly and Ross Levine
others, in that specific countries at specific points in their develop-
ment processes fit different models of growth. The big picture emerg-
ing from cross-country growth comparisons, however, is the simple
observation that creating the incentives for productive factor accu-
mulation is more important for growth than factor accumulation per
se. In assembling and presenting these stylized facts of economic
growth, we hope to stimulate growth research and thereby enhance
public policy and poverty alleviation.
1. IT’S NOT FACTOR ACCUMULATION
Physical and human capital accumulation play key roles in ignit-
ing and accounting for economic progress in some countries, but factor
accumulation does not account for the bulk of cross-country differences
in the level or growth of per capita GDP in a broad cross-section of
countries. Something else—namely, total factor productivity (TFP)—
accounts for the bulk of cross-country differences in both the level and
growth rate of per capita GDP.
The empirical importance of TFP has motivated many economists to
develop models of TFP. Some models focus on technological change
(Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Romer, 1990),
others on impediments to adopting new technologies (Parente and Prescott,
1996). Some highlight externalities (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988), while
others focus on disaggregated models of sectoral development (Kongsamut,
Rebelo, and Xie, 1997) or cost reductions (Harberger, 1998). The remain-
der of this section briefly presents evidence on factor accumulation and
growth and discusses the implications for models and policy.
1.1 Growth Accounting and Variance Decomposition
We consider three questions. First, what part of a country’s growth
rate is accounted for by factor accumulation and TFP growth? We thus
examine the sources of growth in individual countries over time. Sec-
ond, what part of cross-country differences in economic growth rates is
accounted for by cross-country differences in growth rates of factor ac-
cumulation and TFP? Here, we examine the ability of the sources of
growth to explain cross-country differences in growth rates. Third, what
part of the intertemporal difference in economic growth rates is ac-
counted for by time-series differences in growth rates of factor accumu-
lation and TFP? We address this question later in the paper, fully ex-
ploiting the cross-country, time-series nature of the data as the basis67 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
for our assessment. Traditional growth accounting forms the basis for
answering these questions.
Growth accounting
The organizing principle of growth accounting is the Cobb-Douglas
aggregate production function. Let y represent national output per per-
son, k the physical capital stock per person, n the number of units of
labor input per person (reflecting work patterns, human capital, etc.),
a a production function parameter (that equals the share of capital





The standard procedure in growth accounting is to divide output
growth into components attributable to changes in the factors of pro-






Consider a hypothetical country with the following characteristics:
a growth rate of output per person of 2 percent, a capital per capita
growth rate of 3 percent, a growth rate of human capital of 0, and a
share of capital in national income of 40 percent (a = 0.4). In this ex-
ample, TFP growth is 0.8 percent, and therefore, TFP growth accounts
for 40 percent (0.8/2) of output growth in this country.
Many authors conduct detailed growth accounting exercises of one or
a few countries, using disaggregated data on capital, labor, human capi-
tal, and capital shares of income. Early, detailed growth accounting exer-
cises of a few countries by Solow (1957) and Denison (1962, 1967) find that
the rate of capital accumulation per person accounted for between one-
eighth and one-fourth of GDP growth rates in the United States and other
industrialized countries, while TFP growth accounted for more than half
of GDP growth in many countries. Subsequent detailed studies highlight
the importance of accounting for changes in the quality of labor and capi-
tal. For example, if growth accountants fail to consider improvements in
the quality of labor inputs stemming from changes in education and health,
then these improvements would be assigned to TFP growth. Unmeasured68 William Easterly and Ross Levine
improvements in physical capital would similarly be inappropriately as-
signed to TFP. Nonetheless, to the extent that TFP comprises quality
improvements in capital, then a finding that TFP explains a substantial
amount of economic growth will properly focus our attention on productiv-
ity, rather than on factor accumulation per se.
Subsequent detailed growth accounting exercises of a few countries
incorporate estimates of changes in the quality of human and physical
capital. These studies also find that TFP growth tends to account for a
large component of the growth of output per worker. Christenson,
Cummings, and Jorgenson (1980) carry out this exercise for a few mem-
ber countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD), albeit prior to the productivity growth slowdown.
Dougherty (1991) includes the slow productivity growth period in a
study of some OECD countries. Elias (1990) conducts a rigorous growth
accounting study for seven Latin American countries, while Young
(1995) focuses on fast-growing East Asian countries. Table 1 summa-
rizes some of these results.3 Some general patterns emerge despite large
cross-country variations in the fraction of growth accounted for by TFP
growth. The fraction of output growth accounted for by TFP growth
hovers around 50 percent for OECD countries. Latin American coun-
tries exhibit greater variation, with the average accounted for by TFP
growth around 30 percent. Finally, factor accumulation appears to have
been a key component of the growth miracle in some of the East Asian
economies (Young, 1995).
These detailed growth accounting exercises may seriously underes-
timate the role of TFP growth in accounting for growth in output per
worker, as emphasized by Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997a). The
studies summarized in table 1 examine output growth. If, however, the
analysis is adjusted to focus on output per worker, then TFP growth
accounts for a much larger share of growth than indicated by the fig-
ures presented in table 1. In particular, Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare
(1997a) show, in an extension of Young (1995), that factor accumula-
tion plays the crucial role only in Singapore (a small city-state) and
that none of the other East Asian miracles suggest that factor accumu-
lation played a dominant role in accounting for economic growth. In
addition, the share attributed to capital accumulation may be exagger-
ated, because it does not take into account how much TFP growth
induces capital accumulation.4 In sum, while factor accumulation is
3. We use the summary in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p.380–81).
4. This point is due to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 352).69 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
very closely tied to economic success in some cases, detailed growth
accounting examinations suggest that TFP growth frequently accounts
for the bulk of output per worker growth.
A second group of studies carries out aggregate growth accounting
exercises of a large cross-section of countries using a conglomerate mea-
sure of capital and an average value of the capital share parameter
from microeconomic studies. Aggregate growth accounting faces the
unenviable task of estimating capital stocks for a broad cross-section of
countries. King and Levine (1994) and Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993)
make some initial estimates of the capital stocks of countries in 1950.
Table 1. Selected Growth Accounting Results for Individual
Countries
Share of growth component
Share of capital GDP growth
(in percent)
Period and country  in output (in percent) Capital Labor TFP
OECD, 1947–1973
France 0.40 5.40  41 4  55
Germany 0.39 6.61  41 3  56
Italy 0.39 5.30  34 2  64
Japan 0.39 9.50  35  23  42
United Kingdom 0.38 3.70  47 1  52
United States 0.40 4.00  43  24  33
OECD, 1960–1990
France 0.42 3.50  58 1  41
Germany 0.40 3.20  59  –8  49
Italy 0.38 4.10  49 3  48
Japan 0.42 6.81  57  14  29
United Kingdom 0.39 2.49  52  –4  52
United States 0.41 3.10  45  42  13
Latin America, 1940–1980
Argentina 0.54 3.60  43  26  31
Brazil 0.45 6.40  51  20  29
Chile 0.52 3.80  34  26  40
Mexico 0.69 6.30  40  23  37
Venezuela 0.55 5.20  57  34 9
East Asia, 1966–1990
Hong Kong 0.37 7.30  42  28  30
Singapore 0.53 8.50  73  32  –5
South Korea 0.32 10.32  46  42  12
Taiwan 0.29 9.10  40  40  20
Source: OECD: Christenson, Cummings, and Jorgenson (1980) and Dougherty (1991); Latin America: Elias (1990);
East Asia: Young (1995).70 William Easterly and Ross Levine
They then use aggregate investment data and assumptions about
depreciation rates to compute capital stocks in later years for over a
hundred countries. The importance of the estimate of the initial capital
stock diminishes over time as a result of depreciation.
We use the capital stock data from the new Penn World Tables 5.6,
based on disaggregated investment and depreciation statistics (such as
equipment and machines, structures, and so forth) for sixty-four coun-
tries (Summers and Heston, 1991). While these data exist for a smaller
number of countries, the Penn World Tables 5.6 capital data suffer
from less aggregation and measurement problems than the aggregate
growth accounting exercises using less precise data.5
The aggregate growth accounting results for a broad selection of
countries also emphasize the role of TFP in accounting for economic
growth. There is enormous cross-country variation in the fraction of
growth accounted for by capital and TFP growth. In the average coun-
try, if we consider only physical capital accumulation, TFP growth
accounts for about 60 percent of output per worker growth using the
Penn World Tables 5.6 capital data and setting a equal to 0.4, which
is consistent with individual country-studies. Other measures of the
capital stock from King and Levine (1994) and Nehru and Dhareshwar
(1993) yield similar results. The aggregate growth accounting results
are illustrated in figure 1 using data from Penn World Tables 5.6
over the period 1980–1992. We divide countries into ten groups ac-
cording to their output per capita growth. The first decile represents
the slowest-growing group of countries. Figure 1 depicts output growth,
5. The paper reports results using the capital stock estimates from the Penn
World Tables, version 5.6 (Summers and Heston, 1991). The Penn World Tables
document the construction of this data. We also constructed capital stock figures
for more countries using aggregate investment figures. For some countries, the
data start in 1951. These data use real investment in 1985 prices and real per
capita GDP (chain index) in constant 1985 prices. We use a perpetual inventory
method to compute capital stocks. Specifically, let K(t) equal the real capital
stock in period t. Let I(t) equal the real investment rate in period t. Let d equal
the depreciation rate, which we assume equals 0.07. Thus, the capital accumula-
tion equations states that K(t + 1) = (1 – d) K(t) + I(t). To compute the capital per
worker ratio we divide K(t) by L(t), where L(t) is the working age population in
period t as defined in the Penn World Tables. To compute the capital-output
ratio, we divide K(t) by Y(t), where Y(t) is real per capita GDP in period t. To
make an initial estimate of the capital stock, we make the assumption that the
country is at its steady-state capital-output ratio. Thus, in terms of steady-state
value, let k = K/Y, let g equal the growth rate of real output, and let I = I/Y. Then,
from the capital accumulation equation plus the assumption that the country is
at its steady state, we know that k = i/[g + d]. If we can obtain reasonable esti-
mates of the steady-state values of i, g, and d, then we can compute a reasonable
estimate of k. The Penn World Tables have data on output going back to 1950,71 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
highlighting that part attributable to per capita capital stock growth.
The figure indicates that capital growth generally accounts for less
than half of output growth. Furthermore, the share of growth ac-
counted for by TFP growth is frequently larger in the faster-growing
countries. Finally, there are large differences across countries in the
relationship between capital accumulation and growth. For example,
output growth in some countries is negative over the period 1980–
1990, while the capital stock per person ratio rose through the de-
cade. Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, and Syria all saw real per capita
GDP fall during the 1980–1992 period at more than one percent per
year, while at the same time their real per capita capital stocks were
growing at over one percent per year and educational attainment was
also increasing. Clearly, these factor injections were not being used
productively. These cases are not representative, but they illustrate
the shortcoming of focusing too heavily on factor accumulation.6
Incorporating estimates of human capital accumulation into these
aggregate growth accounting exercises does not materially alter the
findings. TFP growth still accounts for more than half of output per
worker growth in the average country. Moreover, the data suggest a
weak—and sometimes inverse—relationship between improvements in
the educational attainment of the labor force and output per worker
growth. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Pritchett (1997) use cross-
country data on economic growth rates to show that increases in hu-
man capital resulting from improvements in the educational attain-
ment of the work force have not positively affected the growth rate of
which we use to compute the initial capital stock estimate as k*Y(initial). To
make the initial estimate of k, the steady-state capital output ratio, we set d = 0.07.
We construct g—the steady-state growth rate—as a weighted average of the
countries’ average growth rate during the first ten years for which we have
output and investment data and the world growth rate. The world growth rate is
computed as 0.0423. Based on Easterly and others (1993), we give a weight of
0.75 to the world growth rate and 0.25 to the country growth rate in computing
an estimate of the steady-state growth rate for each individual country, g. We
then compute i as the average investment rate during the first ten years for
which we have data. With values for d, g, and i for each country, we can estimate
k for each country. To reduce the influence of business-cycles in making the
estimate of Y(initial), we use the average real output value between 1950–1952
as an estimate of initial output, Y(initial). The capital stock in 1951 is thus given
as Y(initial)*k. If output and investment data do not start until 1960, everything
is moved up one decade for that country. Given depreciation, the guess at the
initial capital stock becomes relatively unimportant decades later.
6. It may be that the conventional measure of investment effort is a cost-
based measure that does not necessarily translate into increasing the value of the
capital stock. Pritchett (1999) makes this point, especially—but not exclusively—
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output per worker. It may be that, on average, education does not
effectively provide useful skills to workers engaged in activities that
generate social returns. There is disagreement, however. Krueger and
Lindahl (1999) argue that measurement error accounts for the lack of
a relationship between per capita growth and human capital accumula-
tion. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) find that the quality of education is
very strongly linked with economic growth. Klenow (1998), however,
demonstrates that models highlighting the role of ideas and productivity
growth do a much better job of matching the data than models focusing
on the accumulation of human capital. More work is clearly needed on
the relationship between education and economic development.
Variance decomposition
While traditional growth accounting measures the portion of a
country’s growth rate that may be attributed to factor accumulation,
we construct indicators of the portion of cross-country differences in
economic growth rates accounted for by cross-country differences in
TFP and factor growth. A variance decomposition of growth provides
Figure 1: Growth Accounting, with Growth Rates by Decile
Source: Summers and Heston (1991).73 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
useful information on the relative importance of cross-country differ-
ences in TFP growth in accounting for cross-country differences in long-
run GDP growth (Jones, 1997). Assuming that a = 0.4, the following
holds for the cross-section of countries:
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After we decompose the sources of growth across countries using
different datasets, cross-country variations in TFP growth account for
more that 60 percent of output growth (see table 2). Furthermore, the
cross-country variation in physical capital alone—excluding the cova-
riance with TFP growth—never accounts for more than 25 percent of
the cross-country variation in per capita GDP growth.
Researchers also incorporate human capital accumulation into these
types of decomposition exercises. We rewrite the variance-decomposi-
tion equations as
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where Df/f refers to factor accumulation per worker and is defined as
the average of the growth rate of physical capital per worker and edu-







Table 2. Variance Decompositiona
Specification and period Contribution of growth component
Without human capital g(tfpk) g(k) cov[g(tfpk), g(k)]
1960–1992 0.58 0.41 0.01
1980–1992 0.65 0.21 0.13
With human capital g(tfpkh) g(kh) cov[g(tfpkh), g(kh)]
1960–1992 (44) 0.94 0.52  –0.45
1980–1987 (50) 0.68 0.20 0.12
a. Based on a sample of sixty non-oil-producing countries. The decomposition with human capital includes
forty-four countries in the longer period (1960–1992) and fifty countries in the 1980s subperiod.74 William Easterly and Ross Levine
where h is educational attainment per worker.7
Incorporating human capital does not alter the basic result: TFP
growth differentials account for the bulk of cross-country growth differ-
ences. Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997b) estimate that differences in
TFP growth account for about 90 percent of the variation in growth
rates of output per worker across a sample of 98 countries over the period
1960-1995 after accounting for human capital accumulation.8 We obtain
similar results using the newly constructed capital stock series from
disaggregated investment data from the Penn World Tables and esti-
mates of the growth rate human capital from Benhabib and Spiegel (1994):
differences in TFP growth account for about 90 percent of cross-country
differences in real per capita GDP growth over the period 1960–1992.
Thus, as we seek to explain cross-country differences in long-run growth
rates, differences in TFP growth—rather than differences in factor accu-
mulation rates—seem like the natural place to start.
Before continuing, it is important to stress the limits of growth ac-
counting. Growth accounting is a mechanical procedure. Using it to eluci-
date a causal story is dangerous. In Solow’s (1956) model, for instance, if A
grows at the exogenously given steady-state rate x, then y and k grow at
the steady-state rate x, too. Growth accounting will, therefore, attribute
ax of output growth to capital growth and then yield the conclusion that
(a*100) percent of growth is due to physical capital accumulation. Also,
growth accounting does not test the statistical significance of the relation-
ship between output growth and capital accumulation. We discuss the
temporal (Granger-causal) relationship between growth and savings, in-
vestment, and education later in the paper. Here, we simply note this
inherent feature of growth accounting before turning to level accounting.
1.2 Level Accounting and the K/Y Ratio
Hall and Jones (1999) renew the level-accounting question: what
part of cross-country differences in per capita income is accounted for
by differences in per capita physical capital? They find that productiv-
ity differences across countries account for the bulk of cross-country
differences in output per worker. We address this question using both
the traditional Denison approach and a modified Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil (1992) approach.
7. Again, different authors use different weights, though this tends not to
change the basic findings.
8. These estimates are based on schooling and job experience.75 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
Denison level accounting
To conduct Denison level accounting, take the ratio of two national












Given data on the factors of production, we can then measure cross-
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(4)
Now, note that the fraction of differences in national output levels
























using the fact that log(ki/kj) = log(ki/kj) – log(yi/yj) and letting k = k/y.
This allows us to measure the extent to which the contribution of
capital is due to capital share, a, and the extent to which it is due to
differences in the capital-output ratio equations. If capital-output ra-
tios are constant across countries i and j, then the contribution of
capital toward accounting for differences in per capita output in coun-
tries i and j simply equals a.
To conduct level accounting, first calculate the percentage short-
fall in output of country i relative to the reference country j:
Pi = 100*(yj – yi)/yj. Then we construct the contribution of capital to
accounting for the output difference as, Pi fki. As in King and Levine76 William Easterly and Ross Levine
(1994), we conduct the level accounting using figures on aggregate capital
stocks, though we use the Penn World Tables 5.6 capital numbers. The
world is divided into five groups of countries ranging from the poorest
to the richest. The richest group is the reference group of countries.
Figure 2 summarizes the level accounting results: TFP accounts
for the bulk of cross-country differences in levels of per capita income.
Group 1 is the poorest group; it has more than a 90 percent shortfall in
per capita GDP relative to the reference group. The very dark area
shows that part of the shortfall in per capita income from the reference
group is due to capital share of output (a), assuming that capital-out-
put ratios are constant. The other marked areas indicate the additional
amount resulting from the fact that capital-output ratios tend to rise
with per capita income. TFP differences are indicated by the clear part
of the bar. As shown, TFP accounts for a large fraction of the huge
differences in per capita income. Even accounting for systematic cross-
country differences in capital-output ratios, the data indicate that capi-
tal differences account for less than 40 percent of the cross-group differ-
ences in per capita income.9
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil’s approach to level
accounting
We consider a second approach to level accounting, suggested by
Mankiw, Romer ,and Weil (1992). They argue that the Solow model
does a good job of accounting for cross-country differences in the level of
9. The K/Y ratio systematically varies with per capita income. Capital-output
ratios are systematically larger in richer countries, and they tend to rise as coun-
tries grow, which is inconsistent with Kaldor’s stylized fact on capital-output ra-
tios. Consider the regression of the capital-output ratio (ki) on a measure of per
capita income relative to that in the United States in the 1980s (yi/yUSA). The
regression yields the following result:
ki = 0.76 + 0.59(yi/yUSA),
(0.10) (0.18)
where ki is the capital-output ratio in country i, standard errors are in parentheses,
and the regression includes fifty-seven non-oil-producing countries. There is a strong
positive relationship between per capita output relative to the United States and the
K/Y ratio. Also, figure 3 shows that K/Y ratio tends to rise in fast-growing countries.
Here, we take countries that grew faster than 3.5 percent per year in per capita
terms over the period 1960–1992. We then plot, year by year, the average value of
their K/Y ratios. As shown, the K/Y ratio rises rapidly over this period of fast growth.
While these differences might be due to transitional dynamics, past work suggests
that physical capital accumulation along the transition path is unlikely to fully
explain level and growth differences (King and Rebelo, 1993).77 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
per capita income. In the steady state of the Solow model, output per
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where Y/L is output per person, A is the level of labor-augmenting pro-
ductivity, s is the investment-to-GDP ratio, x is the rate of labor-aug-
menting productivity growth, d is depreciation, n is population growth,
and a is the share of capital income in GDP. We assume productivity
growth of 2 percent and a depreciation rate of 7 percent. Following
Mankiw, Romer ,and Weil, we take logs of both sides and regress the
log of output per person on a constant (ln A) and the log of the second
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We call this second term MRW.
Figure 2: Development Accounting, by Income Quintilea
a. Fifty-seven non-oil-producing countries.78 William Easterly and Ross Levine
We extend the MRW approach by allowing A to differ across conti-
nents, across oil-producing versus non-oil-producing countries, and
across OECD versus non-OECD countries (the regions are all inclu-
sive; the OECD and OIL dummies measure shifts relative to their re-
spective regions). The results are in table 3.
While there is a significant correlation of income with the MRW
investment term (consistent with the Solow model), we refute the
original MRW idea that productivity levels are the same across coun-
tries. South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa have significantly lower
productivity than other regions (that is, income differences that are
not explained with the MRW term). The OECD group has higher
productivity than the rest of the world by a factor of 3 (e1.087). Once
we allow the productivity level to vary, the coefficient on MRW im-
plies a capital share of 0.31, which is in line with most estimates
from national income accounting.
Table 3. MRW Regression with Continent Dummiesa
Variable Coefficient Standard error t statistic Probability
OECD 1.087817 0.107084 10.15857 0.0000
East Asia 7.559995 0.176696 42.78525 0.0000
South Asia 7.065895 0.139239 50.74634 0.0000
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.946945 0.090968 76.36658 0.0000
Western Hemisphere 7.838313 0.102363 76.57349 0.0000
Middle East and North Africa 7.777138 0.143632 54.14642 0.0000
Europe 7.717543 0.133190 57.94384 0.0000
OIL 0.691058 0.157605 4.384760 0.0000




Standard error of regression 0.508076
Sum squared residuals 33.81651
Log likelihood –98.99247
Mean dependent variable 7.79
Standard deviation dependent variable 0.994
Akaike information criterion 1.539
Schwarz information criterion 1.708
F statistic 56.810
Prob (F statistic) 0.000
a. Dependent variable is the average log per capita income 1960–1995. Estimation method is ordinary least squares,
with 139 included observations. Standard errors and covariance are White heteroskedasticity consistent.79 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
Mankiw, Romer ,and Weil report that they are even more suc-
cessful at explaining cross-country income differences when they in-
clude a measure of human capital investment, which they define as
[ln sh – ln(x + d + n)]. They define the flow of investment in human
capital, sh, as the secondary enrollment ratio times the proportion of
the labor force of secondary school age. Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare
(1997b) and Romer (1995) criticize this measure as overestimating
the cross-country variation in human capital by ignoring primary
enrollment, which varies much less across countries than secondary
enrollment. Nevertheless, we reproduce this calculation for the pe-
riod 1960–1995 and call the resultant term MRWH. This new regres-
sion is reported in table 4.
Although the human capital investment term is highly significant,
the original physical capital investment term is only marginally
Table 4. MRW Regression with Continent Dummies,
Including Human Capitala
Standard
Variable Coefficient error t statistic Probability
OECD 0.999172 0.126361 7.907255 0.0000
East Asia 8.040507 0.212161 37.89818 0.0000
South Asia 7.593671 0.184937 41.06093 0.0000
Sub-Saharan Africa 7.636055 0.207923 36.72545 0.0000
Western Hemisphere 8.285468 0.136361 60.76117 0.0000
Middle East and North Africa 8.345100 0.192838 43.27516 0.0000
Europe 8.222288 0.161656 50.86290 0.0000
OIL 0.618785 0.179383 3.449517 0.0008
MRW 0.168531 0.095305 1.768343 0.0796




Standard error of regression 0.460689
Sum squared residuals 24.61913
Log likelihood -75.92250
Mean dependent variable 7.779659
Standard deviation dependent variable 1.024315
Akaike information criterion 1.363849
Schwarz information criterion 1.588951
F statistic 55.77363
Prob (F statistic) 0.000000
a. Dependent variable is LQAV6095. Estimation method is ordinary least squares, with 126 included observa-
tions. Standard errors and covariance are White heteroskedasticity consistent.80 William Easterly and Ross Levine
significant. The OECD productivity advantage and the continental
differences in productivity are of the same magnitude as before.
We go on to estimate equation 8 in first differences from the first
half of the period to the second half of the period to eliminate country
fixed effects. These results indicate that the change in the MRW vari-
able is not statistically significant. We also find that TFP growth—the
constant in the equation in first differences—varies significantly across
continents. This is consistent with our earlier finding that most of the
cross-country variation in per capita growth rates is due to differences
in TFP growth and not to transitional dynamics between steady states.
1.3 Causality
Growth accounting is different from causality. Factor accumula-
tion could ignite productivity growth and overall economic growth. Fac-
tor accumulation could thus cause growth even though it does not ac-
count for much of the cross-country differences in growth rates or cross-
country differences in the level of per capita GDP. If this were the case,
then it would be both analytically appropriate and policy-wise to focus
on factor accumulation. There is also the well-known cross-section cor-
relation between the investment share and growth (see, for example,
Levine and Renelt, 1992).
Available evidence, however, suggests that physical and human
capital accumulation do not cause faster growth. For instance,
Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Zejan (1996) show that output growth Granger-
causes investment. Injections of capital do not seem to be the driving
force of future growth. Similarly, Carroll and Weil (1994) show that
causality tends to run from output growth to savings, not the other
way around. Evidence on human capital tells a similar story. Bils and
Klenow (2000) argue that the direction of causality runs from growth
to human capital, not from human capital to growth. Thus, in terms of
both physical and human capital, the data do not provide strong sup-
port for the contention that factor accumulation ignites faster growth
in output per worker.
1.4 Remarks
Although there are important exceptions, as Young (1995) makes
clear, something other than factor inputs accounts for the bulk of cross-
country differences in both per capita income and growth rates. Fur-
thermore, while growth accounting does not equal causality, research81 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
suggests that increases in factor accumulation do not ignite faster out-
put growth in the future. More work is certainly needed in this area,
but the available evidence does not suggest that the direction of causal-
ity runs from physical or human capital accumulation to economic
growth in the broad cross-section of countries. Finally, measurement
error may reduce the confidence that we have in growth and level ac-
counting. The residual is large, however, in both level and growth ac-
counting. Also, growth and level accounting in the 1950s and 1960s
produce similar estimates to those generated in the 1990s. This im-
plies that measurement error would have to have two systematic com-
ponents: the growth rate of measurement error would have to be posi-
tive and large in fast-growing countries, and the level component of
measurement error would have to be positive and large in rich coun-
tries. A considerable body of evidence suggests that while measure-
ment problems may play a role, “something else” besides factor accu-
mulation is critical for understanding cross-country differences in the
level and growth rate of per capita GDP.
The profession uses the rather vague term, TFP, to refer to the
“something else” that accounts for growth and level differences across
countries. In giving theoretical content to this residual, Grossman and
Helpman (1991), Romer (1990), and Aghion and Howitt (1998) focus on
technology; that is, better instructions for combining raw materials
into useful products and services. Others take a different approach for
providing economic meaning to the residual. Romer (1986), Lucas (1988),
and others focus on externalities, including spillovers, economies of scale,
and various complementarities in explaining the large role played by
TFP in accounting for differences in the level and growth rates of GDP
per worker.10 Alternatively, Harberger (1998) views the residual in
terms of real cost reductions. He argues that “there are at least 1001
ways to reduce costs and that most of them are actually followed in one
part or other of any modern complex economy” (p. 3). He urges econo-
mists not to focus on one underlying cause of the residual, since several
factors may produce real cost reductions in different sectors of the
economy at different times.11 This is consistent with industry studies
that reveal considerable cross-sector variation in TFP growth (Kendrick
and Grossman, 1980). Prescott (1998), who also focuses on technology,
10. Burnside (1996) presents evidence that suggests that physical capital ex-
ternalities seem to be relatively unimportant. Klenow (1998) reports evidence
that is consistent with technological change based model of growth.
11 . Costello (1993) shows that TFP has a strong country component and is not
specific to particular industries.82 William Easterly and Ross Levine
suggests that cross-country differences in resistance to the adoption of
better technologies (arising from politics and policies) help explain cross-
country differences in TFP.12 Empirically determining the relative im-
portance of each of these conceptions of TFP would be very useful for
the design of both models and policies.
2. DIVERGENCE, NOT CONVERGENCE
Over the very long run, the world’s economies have undergone “di-
vergence, big time,” in the words of Pritchett (1997). Figure 3 shows
that the richest nations in 1820 subsequently grew faster than the
countries that ranked poorest that year. The ratio of richest to poorest
grew from 6 to 1 in 1820 to 70 to 1 in 1992. If we look back even further
in time, prior to the Industrial Revolution (1700–1750) the difference
between the richest and poorest countries was probably only about 2 to
1 (Bairoch, 1993, p. 102–6). The big story over the last 200 or 300 years
is thus one of massive divergence in the levels of per capita income of
the rich and the poor.13 While the poor are not getting poorer, the rich
are getting richer a lot faster than the poor.
The rich continue to grow faster than the poor. Absolute divergence
has continued over the last thirty years, though not as dramatically as
in earlier periods When countries are classified into quintiles based on
per capita income in 1960, the average growth of per capita income for
each quintile in the period 1960–1992 is as follows: the poorest fifth of
countries grew by 1.4 percent, the second poorest fifth by 1.2 percent,
the middle fifth by 1.8 percent, the second richest by 2.6 percent, and
the richest by 2.2 percent. China and India—two countries with very
large populations—have performed well recently, which improves the
distribution. Nevertheless, growth differences have diverged signifi-
cantly even using recent data.14
Measures of divergence understate the degree of absolute divergence
over 1960–1992. Many countries that the World Bank classified as low
or middle income in the 1990s do not have complete data, whereas all
12 . See Holmes and Schmitz (1995); Parente (1994); Parente and Prescott
(1996); and Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
13. See Lucas (1998) for an extensive discussion of this divergence, which he
interprets as reflecting different takeoff times for various economies and which
he predicts will decrease as new countries take off.
14. The usual finding that initial income and growth are uncorrelated relies
on data that go through 1981 or 1985 and a linear regression of growth on initial
income. The use of more recent data (through 1992) and the analysis of quintiles
account for our finding of absolute divergence.83 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
industrial countries have complete data. This imparts a bias toward
convergence in the data, as DeLong (1988) points out with regard to
Baumol’s (1986) finding of convergence among industrial countries.
When the countries that are rich at the end are overrepresented in the
sample, this biases the sample toward convergence. The growth rates
of the lower three-fifths of the sample would be even lower if we had
data on some of the disasters that were classified by the World Bank as
low or middle income in the 1990s.
Figure 3: Growth Rates Divergence between Rich and poor,
1820–199284 William Easterly and Ross Levine
This tendency toward divergence if anything has become more pro-
nounced with time. Easterly (2001) finds that the bottom half of coun-
tries ordered by per capita income in 1980 registered zero per capita
growth over 1980–1998, while the top half continued to register posi-
tive growth. This was not because of divergence in policies; the study
shows that policies in poor countries converged toward those of rich
countries over 1980–1998.
While conditional convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) is
certainly a feature of many cross-economy datasets, it is difficult to
look at the growing differences between the rich and poor and not focus
on divergence. The conditional convergence findings hold only after con-
ditioning on an important mechanism for divergence—spillovers from
the initial level of knowledge (for which conditional convergence re-
gressions may be controlling with initial level of schooling). Conditional
convergence also could follow mechanically from mean reversion (Quah,
1993). Since most growth models are closed economy models, it is worth
looking at what happens to convergence in closed economies. Kremer
(1993) and Ades and Glaeser (1999) find absolute divergence in the
majority of developing economies that are closed economies, suggesting
an extent-of-the-market effect on growth in closed economies.
These findings of divergence should be seen within the context of
other stylized facts. Romer (1986) shows that the growth rates of the
richest countries have not slowed over the last century. King and Rebelo
(1993) show that return to capital in the United States has not fallen
over the last century. Taken together, these observations do not natu-
rally focus one’s attention on a model that emphasizes capital accumula-
tion and that has diminishing returns to factors, some fixed factor of
production, and constant returns to scale. At the same time, these obser-
vations do not provide unequivocal support for any particular conception
of what best explains the “something else” producing these stylized facts.
3. GROWTH IS NOT PERSISTENT, BUT FACTOR
ACCUMULATION IS
Growth is remarkably unstable over time. The correlation of per
capita growth in 1977–1992 with per capita growth in 1960–1976 across
135 countries is only 0.08.15 This low persistence of growth is not just
a characteristic of the postwar era. For the twenty-five countries for
15. Data on per capita growth are taken from Summers and Heston. The low
persistence of growth rates and the high persistence of investment and education
were previously noted in Easterly and others (1993).85 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
which data are available, there is a correlation of only 0.097 across
1820–1870 and 1870–1929.16
In contrast, the cross-period correlation of per capita capital growth
is 0.41 For models that postulate a linear relationship between growth
and investment-to-GDP (thus using investment-to-GDP as an alterna-
tive measure of capital accumulation), the mismatch in persistence is
even worse.17 The correlation of investment-to-GDP in 1977–1992 with
investment-to-GDP in 1960–1976 is 0.85. Models that postulate per
capita growth as a function of human capital accumulation do no bet-
ter. The correlation across 1960–1976 and 1977–1992 for primary en-
rollment is 0.82, while the cross-period correlation for secondary en-
rollment is 0.91. This suggests that much of the large variation of
growth over time is not explained by the much smaller variation in
physical and human capital accumulation.
3.1 Inconsistent Patterns of Growth
The typical model of growth, in both the old and new growth litera-
tures, features a steady-state growth rate. Historically, this was prob-
ably inspired by the U.S. experience of remarkably steady growth of
about 2 percent per capita over nearly two centuries (as noted by Jones,
1995a, 1995b; Rebelo and Stokey, 1995).
Since all countries must have had prior histories of stagnation,
another characterization of the typical growth path is the so-called takeoff
into self-sustained growth.18 The prevailing image is a smooth accel-
eration from stagnation into steady-state growth. The developing coun-
tries are supposed to have taken off beginning in the 1960s, when their
growth was rapid and exceeded expectations.
Subsequent experience did not bear out the idea of steady growth
beginning in the 1960s. Booms and crashes characterized the growth
experiences of many countries (Pritchett, 1998; Rodrik, 1998). Suppose
we take ten-year average growth rates, which should be long enough to
iron out cyclical swings. The cross-section standard deviation of these
decade averages is about 2.5 percentage points. The variation over time
16. Data are from Maddison (1995).
17. Models supposing a linear relationship between growth and investment
have a long history in economics. See Easterly (1999) for a review of the Harrod-
Domar tradition, which continues down to the present. For a new growth theory
justification of this relationship, see McGrattan (1998).
18. The phrase is originally from Rostow (1960). More recent theoretical
modeling of takeoff includes Baldwin (1998); Krugman and Venables (1995); Jones
(1999); Lucas (1998); Hansen and Prescott (1998).86 William Easterly and Ross Levine
swamps the cross-section variation. In forty-eight out of 119 countries
with twenty years or more of data over 1960–1997, one can find a break-
point such that the subsequent decade’s per capita growth is more than
5 percentage points—two cross-section standard deviations—above or
below the previous decade’s growth.19 Figure 4 illustrates the roller
coaster ride of Côte d’Ivoire, Guyana, Jamaica, and Nigeria. All of the
countries with growth booms or crashes were developing countries, ex-
cept for Greece and Portugal. Stable growth may be a better descrip-
tion of industrial than developing countries.
How many countries have exhibited consistently stable and respect-
able growth? Out of eighty-eight industrial and developing countries with
complete data for 1960–1997, only twelve countries had growth above 2
percent per capita in every decade. Half of these were in East Asia.
3.2 Variance Decomposition over Time
This supposition of unstable growth is confirmed by an intertemporal
variance-decomposition exercise. This time, we conduct the decomposi-
tion over time rather than across countries. In conjunction with the
cross-country variance decomposition presented above, this analysis
represents a full exploration of the panel data we have constructed on
growth and its factors. We set up a panel of seven five-year time peri-
ods for each country for per capita growth and physical capital per
capita growth. We then subtract off the country means and analyze the
variance using the same formula as before:
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We find that TFP accounts for 86 percent of the intertemporal varia-
tion in overall growth and that TFP growth accounts for 61 percent of
the cross-sectional variation. In other words, growth is much more
unstable over time than physical capital growth.
In addition to highlighting the importance of TFP for explaining long-
run development patterns, the findings that growth is not persistent and
that growth patterns are very different across countries complicate the
challenge for economic theorists. Existing models miss important develop-
19. Thirty-seven countries had a growth drop of 5 percentage points or more,
nineteen countries had a growth increase of 5 percentage points or more, and
eight countries were included in both groups.87 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
ment experiences. Some countries grow steadily (for example, the United
States). Some grow steadily and then stop for long periods (Argentina).
Some do not grow for long periods and then suddenly take off (Korea and
Thailand). Others have basically never grown (Somalia). Sole reliance on
either steady-state models or standard multiple equilibria models will have
a difficult time accounting for these very different growth experiences.
Different models may be needed for different patterns of growth across
countries. Steady-state models fit the U.S.-type experience. The unstable
growth cases fit more naturally into multiple equilibria models, since the
long-run fundamentals of the countries are stable.20
Figure 4: Examples of Variable per Capita Income over Time
20. The nonpersistence of growth rates does not inherently contradict the
stylized fact of divergence or the stylized fact that national policies influence long-
run growth rates. While policies are both persistent and significantly associated
with long-run growth (which is not persistent), the R squared of the growth re-
gression is generally smaller than 0.50. Thus, something else (besides national
policies) is very important for explaining cross-country differences in long-run
growth rates. In terms of divergence, the stylized fact on the nonpersistence of
growth rates emphasizes that growth follows very different paths across coun-
tries and that there is a high degree of volatility. Nevertheless, some countries
have achieved comparatively greater success over the long run. While England,
France, and Germany have experienced growth fluctuations, they have enjoyed a
steeper—and less volatile—growth path than Argentina and Venezuela, for ex-
ample. The growth paths of Argentina, Venezuela, and other countries have not
only been more volatile, but have experienced dramatic changes in trends.88 William Easterly and Ross Levine
4. WHEN IT RAINS, IT POURS
This section presents a large array of new information on the de-
gree to which economic activity is highly concentrated. We use cross-
country data, data from counties within the United States, informa-
tion from individual developing countries, and data on international
flows of capital, labor, and human capital to examine economic concen-
tration. This concentration has a fractal-like quality: it recurs at all
levels of analysis, from the global level down to the city level. This
concentration suggests that some regions have something that attracts
all factors of production, while other regions do not.
One can speculate on the “something else” driving factor flows. Bet-
ter policies in area Z than in area Y could explain factor flows. These
policies could include legal systems, property rights, political stability,
public education, infrastructure, taxes, regulations, macroeconomic sta-
bility, and so forth. Such policies, however, are national in nature,
whereas we document within-country concentration. Externalities may
play an important role in congregating factors. Policy differences, or
externalities, or differences in “something else” do not have to be large:
small TFP differences can have dramatic long-run implications. Thus,
while we do not offer a specific explanation, our results further moti-
vate work on economic geography as a vehicle for better understanding
economic growth.
4.1 Concentration
At the global level, high income status is concentrated among a
small number of nations. The top twenty nations of the world have only
15 percent of the world’s population but produce 50 percent of world
GDP. The poorest half of the world’s population account for only 14
percent of global GDP.21
Map 1 shows the richest nations in black and the poorest in gray.
These concentrations of wealth and poverty have an ethnic and geo-
graphic dimension: eighteen of the top twenty nations are in Western
Europe or in areas settled primarily by Western Europeans. Seventeen
of the poorest twenty nations are in tropical Africa. The richest nation
in 1985 (the United States) had an income fifty-five times that of the
21. These calculations omit the oil-producing countries, in which GDP is not
properly measured because all of oil extraction is treated as current income rather
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poorest nation (Ethiopia). Taking into account the inequality within
countries, the international income differences are even starker. The
richest quintile in the United States had an income that was 528 times
the income of the poorest quintile in Guinea-Bissau.
Income at the global level is highly concentrated in space also. Sort-
ing by GDP per square kilometer, the densest 10 percent of the world’s
land area accounts for 54 percent of its GDP; the least dense half of
nations’ land area produces only 11 percent of world GDP.22
These calculations are done assuming that income is evenly spread
among people and land area within nations, so they understate the
degree of concentration. Wealth and poverty are highly concentrated
within nations, as well. We illustrate this point with the nation for
which we have the most detailed data: the United States.
22. An alternative explanation is that some land areas have a large productiv-
ity advantage although they account for a small share of the earth’s surface.
Mellinger, Sachs, and Gallup (1999) argue that this is the case with temperate
coastal zones. If this were true, economic activity would be distributed fairly evenly
along temperate coastal zones (adjusting for any small intrinsic differences among
such zones). However, casual observation suggests high bunching of activity even
along temperate coastal zones.
Map 1. The Rich and the Poora
a. The countries in black contain 15 percent of world population but produce 50 percent of world GDP. The
countries in gray contain 50 percent of world population but produce 14 percent of world GDP.90 William Easterly and Ross Levine
Map 2. Wealth and Abundance of Land
a. Counties shown in black take up 2 percent of U.S. land area but account for half of U.S. GDP.
We used the database of 3,141 counties in the United States to
examine income and poverty concentration. When we sorted counties
by GDP per square mile, we found a 50 and 2 rule: 50 percent of GDP
is produced in counties that account for only 2 percent of the land,
while the least dense counties that account for 50 percent of the land
produce only 2 percent of GDP. This result is not just a consequence of
the large unsettled areas of the West and Alaska. If we restrict the
calculation to land east of the Mississippi, we still find extreme concen-
tration: 50 percent of GDP is produced on 4 percent of the land. The
densest county is New York, NY, which has a GDP per square mile of
$1.5 billion. This is about 55,000 times higher than the least dense
county east of the Mississippi ($27,000 per square mile in Keweenaw,
MI). Even this comparison understates the degree of concentration,
since the most casual empiricism detects rich and poor areas within a
given county. (New York county contains Harlem as well as Wall Street.)
Map 2 shows these concentrations of counties accounting for half of
U.S. GDP. Obviously, another name for these concentrations is cities.
This concentration is explained by the fact that most economic activity
takes place in densely populated metropolitan areas. Metropolitan coun-
ties are $3,300 richer per person than rural counties (the difference is91 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
statistically significant, with a t statistic of 29). More generally, there
is a strong correlation between per capita income of U.S. counties and
their population density (correlation coefficient of 0.48 for the log of
both concepts, with a t statistic of 30 on the bivariate association). Re-
stricting the sample to metropolitan counties still yields concentration:
50 percent of metropolitan GDP is produced in counties accounting for
only 6 percent of metropolitan land area.23
There are also regional income differences between metropolitan ar-
eas. Metropolitan areas in the Boston-to-Washington corridor have a per
capita income that is $5,874 higher, on average, than other metropolitan
areas. This is a huge difference: it is equal to 2.4 standard deviations in
the metropolitan area sample. Although there may be differences in the
cost of living, they are unlikely to be so large as to explain this difference.24
Other possible explanations of geographic concentration include in-
herent geographic advantages of some areas. Like Mellinger, Sachs,
and Gallup (1999), Rappaport and Sachs (1999) argue that spatial con-
centration of activity in the United States has much to do with access
to the coast. However, casual observation suggests high concentration
even within coastal areas (there are sections of the BosWash corridor
in which a radio cannot even pick up a station). It also could come
about because of high transport costs and low congestion costs
(Krugman, 1991, 1995, 1998; Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 1999).
These latter authors also point to locations of particular industries in
certain locales (such as the Silicon Valley phenomenon) as evidence of
other types of geographic spillovers, including technology spillovers and
specialized producer services that have high fixed costs. The high rents
in downtown metropolitan areas suggest that congestion costs are very
significant. As Lucas (1988) says, “what can people be paying Manhat-
tan or downtown Chicago rents for, if not for being near other people?”
4.2 Poor Areas
Not only riches are concentrated in the United States, but pov-
erty is regionally concentrated, as well. These concentrations have
an ethnic dimension. As map 3 shows, four ethnic-geographic clus-
ters of counties have poverty rates above 35 percent: counties in the
23. Metropolitan counties are those that belong to a PMSA or MSA in the
census classification of counties.
24. The rent component of the cost of living may reflect either the productiv-
ity or the amenity advantages of the area. It seems unlikely that amenities are
different enough among areas to explain these differences.92 William Easterly and Ross Levine
West that have large proportions (>35 percent) of native Americans;
counties along the Mexican border that have large proportions (>35
percent) of Hispanics; counties adjacent to the lower Mississippi River
in Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana and in the “black belt” of
Alabama, all of which have large proportions of blacks (>35 per-
cent); counties with virtually all whites in the mountains of eastern
Kentucky.
The county data did not pick up the well-known inner-city form of
poverty, which affects mainly blacks, because counties that include in-
ner cities also include rich suburbs.25 Of course, poverty is concentrated
in the inner city, as well. An inner-city zip code in Washington, DC—
namely, College Heights in Anacostia—has only one-fifth of the income
of a rich zip code (20816) in Bethesda, MD. This has an ethnic dimension
again, since College Heights is 96 percent black whereas the rich zip
code in Bethesda is 96 percent white. The Washington metropolitan area
as a whole features a striking East-West divide between poor and rich
zip codes, which again roughly corresponds to the black-white ethnic
Map 3. Poverty traps in U.S. countiesa
a. Counties in black have a poverty rate of over 35 percent.
25. An isolated example of an all-black city is East St. Louis, IL, which is 98
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divide (see map 4).26 Borjas (1995, 1999) suggests that strong neigh-
borhood and ethnic externalities may help explain poverty and ethnic
clusters within cities. Sorting 1990 census tracts by percent of blacks,
the census tracts with the highest shares of blacks account for fifty
percent of the black population but contain only one percent of the
white population.27 While this segregation by race and class could
simply reflect the preferences of rich white people for living next to
each other, economists usually prefer to explain economic phenomena
through economic motivations rather than exogenous preferences.
Bénabou (1993, 1996) stresses that the endogenous sorting between
rich and poor allows the rich to take advantage of externalities like
locally funded schools.
26. Brookings Institution (1999) notes that this East-West geographic divide
of the Washington area is reflected in many socioeconomic variables like poverty
rates, free and reduced-price school lunches, road spending, and so forth.
27. From the Urban Institute’s Underclass Database, which contains data on
white, black, and “other” population numbers for 43,052 census tracts in the
United States.
Map 4. Rich and Poor Zip Codes in the Washington
Metropolitan Areaa
a. Dollar signs indicate richest fourth of zip codes in metropolitan area; pound signs indicate poorest fourth
of zip codes.94 William Easterly and Ross Levine
Poverty areas exist in many countries: northeast Brazil, south-
ern Italy, Chiapas in Mexico, Balochistan in Pakistan, and the Atlan-
tic Provinces in Canada. Researchers have found externalities to be
part of the explanation of these poverty clusters. Bouillon, Legovini,
and Lustig (1999) find that there is a negative Chiapas effect in Mexi-
can household income data—and that this effect has gotten worse
over time. Households in the poor region of Tangail/Jamalpur in
Bangladesh earn less than identical households in the better-off re-
gion of Dhaka (Ravallion and Wodon, 1998). Ravallion and Jalan (1996)
and Jalan and Ravallion (1997) likewise find that households in poor
counties in southwest China earn less than households with identical
human capital and other characteristics in rich Guangdong Prov-
ince. Finally, Rauch (1993) analyzes U.S. data and finds that indi-
viduals with identical characteristics earn less in low human capital
cities than in high human capital cities.
4.3 Ethnic Differentials
A number of theories stress in-group externalities to explain
the continuity of patterns of wealth distribution (Borjas, 1992, 1995,
1999; Bénabou, 1993, 1996). Poverty and riches are concentrated
among certain ethnic groups; it would not be appealing to explain
these differences by exogenous savings preferences. Discrimina-
tion and intergenerational transmission could also explain ethnic
differences, but in terms of growth models, such differences seem
more consistent with in-group spillovers than with individual fac-
tor accumulation.
The purely ethnic differentials in the United States are well known.
Blacks earn 41 percent less than whites; Native Americans earn 36
percent less; Hispanics earn 31 percent less; Asians earn 16 percent
more.28 There are also more subtle ethnic earnings differentials. Third-
generation immigrants with Austrian grandparents had 20 percent
higher wages in 1980 than third-generation immigrants with Belgian
grandparents (Borjas, 1992). Among Native Americans, the Iroquois
earn almost twice the median household income of the Sioux.
Other ethnic differentials appear by religion. Episcopalians earn 31
percent more income than Methodists (Kosmin and Lachman, 1993, p.
260) Twenty-three percent of the Forbes 400 richest Americans are
28. U.S. Government (1996, tables 52 and 724).95 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
Jewish, although only two percent of the U.S. population is Jewish
(Lipset, 1997).29
In Latin America, the main ethnic divide is between indigenous
and nonindigenous populations, as table 5 illustrates. Even within in-
digenous groups in Latin America, however, ethnic differentials play a
strong role in explaining income differences. Guatemala’s indigenous
population, for instance, comprises four main language groups. Of these,
the Quiche-speaking indigenous groups earn 22 percent less on aver-
age than Kekchi-speaking groups (Patrinos, 1997).
In Africa, there are widespread anecdotes about income differen-
tials among ethnic groups, but little hard data. The one exception is
South Africa. South African whites earn 9.5 times the income of blacks.
More surprisingly, among all-black traditional authorities (an admin-
istrative unit something like a village) in the state of KwaZulu-Natal,
the ratio of the richest traditional authority to the poorest is 54 (Klitgaard
and Fitschen, 1997).
4.4 Factor Movements
The movement of all factors of production toward the richest areas
reinforces the concentration of economic activity. A related fact is that
each factor of production flows to where it is already abundant.
The migration of labor is overwhelmingly directed toward the rich-
Table 5. Poverty among Indigenous Peoples in Latin America
Poverty rate for Poverty rate for





Source: Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1994, p. 6).
29. Ethnic differentials are also common in other countries. The ethnic di-
mension of rich trading elites is well-known: the Lebanese in West Africa, the
Indians in East Africa, and the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Virtually
every country has its own ethnographic group noted for their success. For ex-
ample, in the Gambia a tiny indigenous ethnic group called the Serahule is re-
ported to dominate business out of all proportion to their numbers; they are often
called Gambian Jews. In Zaire, Kasaians have been dominant in managerial and
technical jobs since the days of colonial rule; they are often called “the Jews of
Zaire” (New York Times, 18 September 1996).96 William Easterly and Ross Levine
est countries. The three richest countries alone (the United States,
Canada, and Switzerland) receive half of the net immigration of all
countries reporting net immigration. Countries in the richest quintile
are all net recipients of migrants. Only eight countries in the ninety
countries that constitute the bottom four-fifths of the sample are net
recipients of migrants. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, pp. 403–10) find
that migration goes from poorer regions to richer regions in samples of
U.S. states, Japanese prefectures, and European regions.
Labor also migrates from sparsely populated areas to densely popu-
lated areas. County data for the United States yield a statistically sig-
nificant correlation of 0.20 between the in-migration rate of counties
from 1980 to 1990 and the population density in 1980. Hence, labor is
flowing to areas where it is already abundant. Our county data also
confirm Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s (1995) finding for migration among
states: people migrate from poor counties to rich counties, with a sta-
tistically significant correlation of 0.21 between initial income and the
in-migration rate. These two finds are related, as there is a significant
positive correlation between population density and per capita income
across counties.30 A regression of the in-migration rate in 1980–1990
by county on population density and per capita income in 1980 finds
both factors to be highly significant.31
Embodied in this flow of labor are flows of human capital toward the
rich countries—the so-called brain drain. We used Grubel and Scott’s (1977)
data to calculate that in the poorest fifth of nations, the probability that an
educated person will immigrate to the United States is 3.4 times higher
than that for an uneducated person. Since we know that education and
income are strongly and positively correlated, human capital is flowing to
where it is already abundant—namely, the rich countries.
A more recent study by Carrington and Detragiache (1998) finds
that those with tertiary education were more likely to migrate to the
United States than those with a secondary education in fifty-one out of
the sixty-one developing countries in their sample. Migration to the
United States among workers with only a primary education or less
was lower than among workers with either secondary or tertiary edu-
cation in all sixty-one countries. Their data yield lower bound estimates
for the highest rates of migration by those with tertiary education as
high as 77 percent (Guyana). Other countries with exceptionally high
30. Ciccone and Hall (1996) report a related finding for U.S. states.
31. The t statistics are 8.2 for the log of population density in 1980 and 8.9 for
the log of per capita income in 1979. The equation has an R squared of 0.065 and
3,133 observations. The county data are from Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999).97 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
32. These are all small countries. Carrington and Detragiache (1998) point out
that U.S. immigration quotas are less binding for small countries, since the legal
immigration quota is 20,000 per country regardless of a country’s population size
(with some exceptions).
33. Casual observation suggests brain drain within countries. The best law-
yers and doctors congregate within a few metropolitan areas like New York,
where skilled doctors and lawyers are abundant, while poorer areas where skilled
doctors and lawyers are scarce have difficulty attracting top-level professionals.
rates of migration among the tertiary educated are Gambia (59 per-
cent), Jamaica (67 percent), and Trinidad and Tobago (57 percent).32
None of the migration rates for the group with primary education or
less exceed 2 percent. The disproportionate weight of the skilled popu-
lation in U.S. immigration may reflect U.S. policy, although as Borjas
(1999) notes, U.S. immigration policy has tended to favor unskilled
labor with family connections in the United States rather than skilled
labor. In the richest fifth of nations, moreover, the probability is roughly
the same that educated and uneducated will emigrate to the United
States. Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992) find that the more highly
educated are more likely to migrate within the United States than
the less educated.33
Capital also flows mainly to areas that are already rich (see Lucas,
1990). In 1990, the richest 20 percent of world population received 92
percent of portfolio capital gross inflows; the poorest 20 percent received
0.1 percent of portfolio capital inflows. The richest 20 percent of the
world population received 79 percent of foreign direct investment; the
poorest 20 percent received 0.7 percent of foreign direct investment.
Altogether, the richest 20 percent of the world population received 88
percent of private capital gross inflows; the poorest 20 percent received
1 percent of private capital gross inflows.
4.5 Evidence on Skill Premiums and Human Capital
Skilled workers earn less, rather than more, in poor countries. This
seems inconsistent with the open economy version of the neoclassical
factor accumulation model developed by Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-
Martin (1995). In their model (which we call the BMS model), capital
flows equalize the rate of return to physical capital across countries,
while human capital is immobile. Immobile human capital explains
the difference in per worker income across nations in Barro, Mankiw,
and Sala-i-Martin. As pointed out by Romer (1995), this implies that
both the skilled wage and the skill premium should be much higher in98 William Easterly and Ross Levine
poor countries than in rich countries. To illustrate this, we specify a




Assuming technology (A) is the same across countries and that rates
of return to physical capital are equated across countries, we solve for
the ratio of the skilled wage in country i to that in country j, as a
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Using the physical and human capital shares suggested by Mankiw
(1995)—which are 0.3 and 0.5, respectively—we calculate that skilled
wages should be five times greater in India than in the United States (to
correspond to a fourteen-fold difference in per capita income). In general,
the equation above shows that skilled wage differences across countries
should be inversely related to per capita income if human capital abun-
dance explains income differences across countries, à la Barro, Mankiw,
and Sala-i-Martin. The skill premium, in turn, should be seventy times
higher in India than in the United States. If the ratio of skilled to un-
skilled wages is about 2 in the United States, then it should be 140 in
India. This would imply a fantastic rate of return to education in India,
seventy times larger than the return to education in the United States.
The facts do not support these predictions: skilled workers earn
more in rich countries. Fragmentary data from wage surveys indicate
that engineers earn an average of $55,000 in New York, compared with
$2,300 in Bombay (Union Bank of Switzerland, 1994). Instead of skilled
wages being five times higher in India than in the United States, skilled
wages are twenty-four times higher in the United States than in India.
The higher wages across all occupational groups is consistent with a
higher A in the United States than in India. Figure 5 shows that the
skilled wage (proxied by salaries of engineers, adjusted for purchasing
power) is positively associated with per capita income across countries,
as a productivity explanation of income differences would imply, and
not negatively correlated, as a BMS human capital explanation of in-
come differences would imply. The correlation between skilled wages
and per capita income across forty-four countries is 0.81.99 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
Within India, the wage of engineers is only about three times
the wage of building laborers. Rates of return to education are simi-
larly only about twice as high in poor countries—about 11 percent
versus 6 percent from low income to high income (Psacharopoulos,
1994, p. 1332)—not forty-two times higher. Consistent with this evi-
dence, we also see that the incipient flow of human capital, despite
barriers to immigration, is toward the rich countries.
4.6 Evaluating Growth Models Given the
Concentration of Wealth and Poverty
The high concentration of income, reinforced by the flow of all fac-
tors toward the richest areas, is inconsistent with the neoclassical growth
model. The distribution of income across space and across people at all
levels is highly skewed to the right: the skewness coefficient is 2.58
across countries in 1980, and it is 2.2 across U.S. cities and 1.60 across
U.S. counties in 1990, where 0 is symmetry. There is no reason to
think that the determinants of income in the neoclassical model (namely,
saving and population growth) are skewed to the right. In contrast,
models of technological complementarities (such as Kremer, 1993) can
explain this skewness.
The concentration of all factors in the rich, densely populated ar-
eas even within countries is similarly incompatible with a version of
the neoclassical model that includes land as a factor of production.
With land in fixed supply, physical capital, human capital, and labor
should all want to flow to areas abundant in land (adjusting for land
quality) but scarce in other factors. Furthermore, in the neoclassical
model, physical and human capital should flow from rich to poor ar-
eas, while unskilled labor should move from poor to rich. In fact,
physical and human capital flows toward already rich areas, while
unskilled labor is less mobile but also tends to flow to rich countries.
This is inconsistent with the neoclassical model as presented by
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).
As demonstrated by this fourth stylized fact, we concur with Klenow
and Rodríguez-Clare (1997b) that the “neoclassical revival in growth
economics” has “gone too far.” The neoclassical model has no explana-
tion for why riches and poverty are concentrated in certain regions
within countries. The neoclassical model also does not explain why there
are such pronounced income differences among ethnic groups. Stylized
fact 4 is consistent with poverty trap models like those of Azariadis and
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and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989). It also supports models of in-
group ethnic and neighborhood externalities (Borjas 1992, 1995, 1999;
Bénabou 1993, 1996) and geographic externalities (Krugman 1991, 1995,
1998; Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 1999).
Stylized fact 4 is also more consistent with a productivity explana-
tion of income differences than with a factor accumulation story. If a
rich area is rich because A is higher, then all factors of production will
tend to flow toward this rich area, reinforcing the concentration.
Spillovers between agents also seem more natural with technological
models of growth, since technological knowledge is inherently more
nonrival and more nonexcludable than factor accumulation. Techno-
logical spillovers among agents will lead to endogenous matching of
rich agents with each other, while their matches will reinforce the
poverty of the poor with other poor people (as in the O-ring story of
Kremer, 1993, or the inequality model of Bénabou, 1996). A better un-
derstanding of economic geography and externalities would help shape
models of economic growth.
5. POLICY MATTERS
The empirical literature on national policies and economic growth
is huge, and it encompasses considerable disagreement about which
policies are most strongly linked with economic growth. Some authors
focus on openness to international trade (Frankel and Romer, 1999),
others on fiscal policy (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993), others on financial
development (Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000), and still others on mac-
roeconomic policies (Fischer, 1993). These papers have at least one com-
mon feature: they all find that some indicator of national policy is strongly
linked with economic growth, which confirms the argument made by
Levine and Renelt (1992).
This section uses recent econometric techniques to examine the
linkages between economic growth and a range of national policies.
Most empirical assessments of the growth-policy relationship are plagued
by three shortcomings. First, existing work does not generally con-
front the issue of endogeneity. Even when authors use instrumental
variables, they frequently assume that many of the regressors are ex-
ogenous and only focus on the potential endogeneity of one variable of
interest. By not fully confronting the issue of causality, existing work
may produce biased assessments. Second, traditional cross-country re-
gressions may suffer from omitted variable bias. That is, cross-country
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thereby produce biased coefficient estimates. Third, almost all cross-
country regressions include lagged real per capita GDP as a regressor.
Since the dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP,
this specification may produce biased coefficient estimates. This paper
uses new statistical procedures that ameliorate these potential biases
so that we can draw more accurate inferences on the impact of national
policies on economic growth.
The paper does not aim to identify the most important policies in-
fluencing growth—we still disagree with one another on that issue.
Rather, this paper compiles key stylized facts associated with long-run
growth and employs the latest econometric techniques to confirm ear-
lier findings that national policies are strongly linked with economic
growth. The regression results are consistent with policies having sig-
nificant long-run effects on national growth rates or on steady-state
levels of national output. Furthermore, the regression results show
that national policies are strongly linked with TFP growth (Beck,
Levine, and Loayza, 2000).
5.1 Econometric Methodology
This subsection briefly describes the generalized method of mo-
ments (GMM) dynamic panel estimator that we use to assess the
relationship between policy and economic growth. Readers who are
less technically inclined can skip this subsection. We begin by con-
structing a panel that consists of data for seventy-three countries
over the period 1960–1995. We average the data over seven
nonoverlapping five-year periods.
Consider the following equation,
( ) 11 1 ititititiit yyyX -- ¢ -=a-+b+h+e (9)
where y is the logarithm of real per capita GDP, X represents the set of
explanatory variables (other than lagged per capita GDP), h is an un-
observed country-specific effect, e is the error term, and the subscripts
i and t represent country and time period, respectively. We also include
time dummies to account for time-specific effects.
We can rewrite equation 9:
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To eliminate the country-specific effect, we take first-differences of
equation 10:
( ) ( ) ( ) 11211 itititititititit yyyyXX ----- ¢ -=a-+b-+e-e . (11)
The use of instruments is required to deal with, first, the likely
endogeneity of the explanatory variables and, second, the problem that
by construction the new error term, eit – eit–1, is correlated with the
lagged dependent variable, yit–1 – yit–2. Under the assumptions (which
we test) that the error term, e, is not serially correlated and the ex-
planatory variables, X, are weakly exogenous (that is, the explanatory
variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with future realizations of
the error term), appropriately lagged values of the regressors can be
used as instruments, as specified in the following moment conditions:
( ) 1 0 itsitit Ey -- Øø e-e= ºß , for s = 2; t = 3,…, T, and (12)
( ) 1 0 itsitit EX -- Øø e-e= ºß , for s = 2; t = 3,…, T. (13)
We refer to the GMM estimator based on these conditions as the
difference estimator.
This difference estimator, however, has conceptual and statistical
shortcomings. Conceptually, we would also like to study the cross-coun-
try relationship between national policies and per capita GDP growth,
which is eliminated in the difference estimator. Statistically, when the
regressors in equation 11 are persistent, lagged levels of X and y are
weak instruments. Instrument weakness influences the asymptotic and
small-sample performance of the difference estimator. Asymptotically,
the variance of the coefficients rises. Weak instruments can produce
biased coefficients in small samples.
To reduce the potential biases and imprecision associated with the
usual difference estimator, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1997) develop a system of regressions in differences and levels.
The instruments for the regression in differences are the same as above;
the instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged differences
of the corresponding variables. These are appropriate instruments un-
der the following additional assumption: although there may be corre-
lation between the levels of the right-hand-side variables and the coun-
try-specific effect in equation 10, there is no correlation between the
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assumption results from the following stationarity property:
itpiitqi EyEy ++ ØøØø ￿h=￿h ºßºß and (14)
itpiitqi EXEX ++ ØøØø ￿h=￿h ºßºß , for all p and q.
The additional moment conditions are
( ) ( ) 1 0 itsitsiit Eyy --- Øø -￿h+e= ºß , for s = 1, and (15)
( ) ( ) 1 0 itsitsiit EXX --- Øø -￿h+e= ºß , for s = 1. (16)
Thus, we use the moment conditions presented in equations 12, 13, 15,
and 16 and employ a GMM procedure to generate consistent and effi-
cient parameter estimates.
Consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the
instruments. To address this issue, we consider two specification tests
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and
Blundell and Bond (1997). The first is a Sargan test of overidentifying
restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments by ana-
lyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the estima-
tion process. The second test examines the hypothesis that the error
term, eit, is not serially correlated. In both the difference regression
and the system regression, we test whether the differenced error term
is second-order serially correlated. (By construction, the differenced er-
ror term is probably first-order serially correlated even if the original
error term is not). We use this system estimator to assess the impact of
policies on economic growth. In addition, we conduct all of these analy-
ses using (1) purely cross-section, ordinary least squares regressions
with one observation per country, (2) the pure different estimator de-
scribed above, and (3) the panel estimator using only the level compo-
nent of the system estimator. All of these exercises yield very similar
results and parameter values (Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000).
5.2 Regressions
To assess the relationship between the exogenous component of
national policies and economic growth, we use a set of conditioning
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empirical work. Specifically, we include the initial level of real per
capita income to control for convergence. The standard neoclassical
growth model predicts convergence to the steady-state per capita out-
put ratio (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). We recognize that the coeffi-
cient on initial income does not necessarily capture only neoclassical
transitional dynamics. In technology diffusion models, initial income
may proxy for the initial gap in TFP between economies, such that
catch-up can occur in TFP as well as in traditional factors of produc-
tion. We also include the average years of schooling as an indicator of
the human capital stock in the economy. This can help in controlling
for differences in steady-state levels of human capital (Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 1992). Schooling may also directly influence economic growth
(Lucas, 1988).
We include five policy indicators. We use the inflation rate and
the ratio of government expenditures to GDP as indicators of macro-
economic stability (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Fischer, 1993). We use
the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP and the black
market exchange rate premium to capture the degree of openness of
the economy (Frankel and Romer, 1999). We also include a measure
of financial intermediary development that equals financial interme-
diary credit to the private sector as a share of GDP (Levine, Loayza,
and Beck, 2000). Again, we do not suggest that these are the most
important policy indicators. We simply assess whether economic growth
is strongly linked with these national policy indicators after control-
ling for endogeneity and other biases plaguing existing empirical work.
Table 6 reports the panel results.
As in much of the cross-country literature, we find evidence of
conditional convergence. Contingent of the level of human capital,
poorer countries tend to grow faster than richer countries as each
country converges toward its steady state, which is consistent with
a major implication of the textbook neoclassical growth model. The
regression also shows that greater human capital—as measured by
the average years of schooling of the working age population—is as-
sociated with faster economic growth. Since our GMM panel estima-
tor controls for endogeneity, this finding suggests that the exogenous
component of schooling exerts a positive impact on economic growth.
These results are consistent both with models that focus on factor
accumulation and with models that focus on total factor productiv-
ity growth.
The results reported in the table are consistent with—but do not
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which, in turn, is consistent with an endogenous productivity growth
model. In contrast, models that feature only transitional factor accu-
mulation dynamics usually predict weaker policy effects on growth
than do endogenous productivity growth models. Complementary work
in Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) suggests a powerful connection
between national policies and TFP growth. The exogenous components
of international openness—as measured by the ratio of trade to GDP
and by the black market exchange rate premiums—are both signifi-
cantly correlated with economic growth. A higher black market ex-
change rate premium exerts a negative impact on growth. More in-
ternational trade tends to boost economic growth. Macroeconomic policy
is also important. Large government tends to hurt economic growth.
Inflation does not enter significantly. While considerable research
suggests a negative link between inflation and economic performance
(Bruno and Easterly, 1998), recent research indicates that inflation
is strongly linked with financial development (Boyd, Levine, and Smith,
2001), such that it may not enjoy an independent link with growth
when controlling for financial development. Finally, we find that a
higher level of financial development boosts economic growth. In sum,
national policies are strongly linked with economic growth.
Table 6. Economic Growth and National Policiesa
Variable Coefficient P value
Constant 0.082 0.875
Initial per capita incomeb -0.496 0.001
Average years of schoolingc 0.950 0.001
Openness to tradeb 1.311 0.001
Inflationc 0.181 0.475
Government sizeb -1.445 0.001
Black market premiumc -1.192 0.001
Private creditb 1.443 0.001
Summary statistic
Sargan testd (p value) 0.506
Serial correlation teste (p value) 0.803
a. Dependent variable is real per capita GDP growth. The regression has 365 total observations and is based on
the analyses in Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000).
b. In the regression, this variable is included as log(variable).
c. In the regression, this variable is included as log(1 + variable).
d. The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.
e. The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation.106 William Easterly and Ross Levine
6. CONCLUSIONS
The major empirical regularities of economic growth emphasize the
role of something other than factor accumulation. The TFP residual ac-
counts for most of the cross-country and cross-time variation in growth.
Income across countries diverges over the long-run, while the growth rates
of the rich are not slowing and returns to capital are not falling. This
observation is less consistent with simple models that feature diminishing
returns, factor accumulation, some fixed factor of production, and con-
stant returns to scale and more consistent with the observation that “some-
thing else” is important for explaining long-run economic success. Growth
is highly unstable over time, while factor accumulation is more stable,
which certainly emphasizes the role of “something else” in explaining varia-
tions in economic growth. We also note that national policies are strongly
linked with long-run economic growth rates. Moreover, we show that all
factors of production flow to the richest areas, suggesting that they are
rich because of high A rather than high K. Finally, we note that diver-
gence of per capita incomes and the concentration of economic activity
suggest that technology has increasing returns.
The paper does not argue that factor accumulation is generally
unimportant, and we do not deny that factor accumulation is critically
important for some countries at specific junctures. Factor accumula-
tion may be very important for some countries. Thus, we are not argu-
ing that TFP explains everything, everywhere, and always. The paper’s
more limited point is that when comparing growth experiences across
many countries, something other than factor accumulation plays a
prominent role in explaining differences in economic performance.
Economists should increase research on the residual determinants
of growth and income, such as technology and externalities. There is
little doubt that technology is a formidable force. Nordhaus (1994) esti-
mates that one BTU of fuel consumption today buys 900 times more
lighting (measured in lumens hours) than in 1800. Computing power
per dollar invested has risen by a factor of 10,000 over the past two
decades. The cost of sending information over optical fiber has fallen by a
factor of 1000 over the past two decades.34 From 1991 to 1998 alone, the
price of a megabyte of hard disk storage fell from five dollars to three
cents.35 Over the last forty years, computing power has increased by a
factor of a million.36 Not every technology has improved at this speed, of
course, but Mokyr (1992) is right to call technology the lever of riches.
34. World Bank (1998–1999, pp. 3, 5, and 57).
35. www.duke.edu/~mccann/q-tech.htm#Death of Distance.
36. DeLong (econ161.berkeley.edu/E_Sidebars/E-conomy_figures2.html).107 It’s Not Factor Accumulation
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